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A Tale of Two Countries: SEZ-led Growth in India and China  
 
After Chairman Mao’s death in 1978, China began its transformation from a closed, 
impoverished nation to a liberalized, economic powerhouse, which it became in just forty years. 
With a GDP of $12 trillion USD in 2017, China is now the second largest economy in the 
world.1 A critical factor in China’s economic success was the 1980 creation of Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs). These areas allowed more relaxed business and trade regulations than the rest of 
the country, attracting foreign trade and investment. China’s SEZs contributed significantly to its 
economy, accounting for 18.5 percent of national GDP and 60 percent of total exports in 2015.2 
After China’s success, the Indian government, which liberalized their economy in 1991, adopted 
the SEZ model in 2000 to address its growing trade deficit and encourage export-led growth.3 
While India’s special economic zones attracted foreign investment, they did not deliver a similar 
transformative impact as witnessed in China, as SEZs accounted for only 19 percent of India’s 
exports in the first twenty years of establishment.4 Several economic and political factors led to 
this discrepancy in SEZ effectiveness between India and China. For instance, India did not need 
to use SEZs to reform its economic system as it already had a liberalized economy. While SEZ 
managers in China were often motivated to promote long-term development, political 
expediency and corruption scandals hindered SEZ growth in India. Furthermore, local 
governments in charge of SEZs in China were given greater political and economic autonomy, 
allowing them to pursue policies adapted to the local economy, while SEZs in India were subject 
to numerous land and policy regulations at the national level. The success of SEZs in 
transforming China’s economy can be attributed to their strategic role in the country’s economic 
liberalization process; India’s attempt at China’s SEZ-led growth failed to achieve similar results 
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 due to the government's limited ambition to improve its economic policies, highlighting that the 
SEZ model is most effective when utilized as a component of larger, comprehensive economic 
reform. This paper compares SEZs in China and India by reviewing their performance 
differences and examining the reasons behind these differences, including policy objectives, 
decentralization of state power, and governance structure. Since SEZs have been most 
extensively used in China and India, the lessons learned from their experiences can be valuable 
to other developing countries seeking to implement SEZs.  
Historical Background  
In 1979, China established four special economic zones located in the coastal cities of 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen. Prior to the creation of SEZs, China was a closed, 
planned economy. Almost all factories and businesses were owned by the government, with 
neither private nor foreign ownership.5 China had limited participation in the global economy, as 
trade share of GDP was less than 10 percent in 1978.6 In experimenting with economic reform 
and liberalization during the early 1980s, China gave corporations in SEZs more economic 
freedom, such as the ability to pay workers floating wages and to create their own labor-contract 
system.7 Although such practices were common in other countries, they were groundbreaking in 
China at the time because they were a shift away from the command economic system under 
Mao Zedong. In short, China used SEZs as test beds for implementing capitalism, described by 
Deng Xiaoping as “crossing the river, feeling the stone one at a time.”8 Beyond the relaxation of 
administrative rules, the Chinese government also offered specific financial incentives for 
foreign investors in the form of various tax "holidays.” For example, SEZ enterprises were 
subject to a corporate tax rate of only 15 percent, versus the 33 percent tax rate imposed on joint 
ventures in the rest of China.9 China also obtained advanced technology from foreign investors 
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 through joint ventures, where foreign business partners provided technology while the Chinese 
owners supplied buildings, sites, and equipment. By 1995, there were 9,000 joint ventures in 
Shenzhen, manufacturing more than 1 billion RMB (120 million USD) worth of products.10   
Before 2000, India did not have SEZs and instead had seven Export Processing Zones 
(EPZs). Although these zones were also designed to facilitate foreign investment, the EPZs 
offered less economic incentives and had a negligible impact on India’s economy.11 India started 
economic liberalization in 1991 under Finance Minister Manmohan Singh. Before the process of 
economic liberalization began, India was one of the most protected and heavily regulated 
economies in the world, with little participation in the global economy. Singh’s extensive 
reforms in 1991 caused policy changes in diverse sectors aimed to encourage greater private 
sector entrepreneurship and foreign trade.12 Partly inspired by the economic success of China’s 
SEZs, India introduced the “Special Economic Zones Bill of 2005” fifteen years later to develop 
zones on a larger scale.13 The number of zones rapidly increased. By 2017, India approved 423 
SEZs, with 221 already operational.14 Similar to China, SEZs in India operated outside the 
domain of customs authorities, providing incentives for both domestic and foreign investors. For 
instance, SEZ units did not have to pay income tax for the first five years and were allowed to 
retain 100 percent of their foreign exchange earnings.15 While both India and China envisioned 
SEZs as an instrument to promote economic growth and industrialization, the two countries 
considerably differed in zone performance.   
The Importance of Fundamental Reform  
 
 Perhaps the most important reason for the diverging Chinese and Indian SEZ outcomes 
was their fundamentally different motives for establishing SEZs. After the death of Chairman 
Mao, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese Communist Party intentionally moved 
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 away from a traditional communist economic model and created SEZs to support the broader 
goal of economic liberalization, using zones to experiment with capitalist policies. India, which 
had already liberalized its economy fifteen years before the creation of SEZs, only used zones to 
attract investment without an overarching purpose. Furthermore, while China absorbed foreign 
technologies through joint ventures in a broad set of industrial sectors, India’s emphasis on the 
IT sector may have led to a lack of economic diversity within SEZs.  
 While China used SEZs to test market-based economic reform policies with the potential 
for nation-wide implementation, India used zones more narrowly to generate economic growth. 
In the late 1970s, the Chinese Cultural Revolution had just ended. The closing of universities 
during the Cultural Revolution created a dire shortage of highly educated personnel, which 
hindered China’s ability to develop new and absorb imported technology, limiting economic 
development.16 In response, Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” (gaige kaifang) policy 
aimed to accelerate economic growth so that the economy would “surge forward” with the 
people “relatively well off.”17 Deng personally initiated the creation of four SEZs in 1979, in the 
cities of Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, and Xiamen. In just six years, these four zones attracted 
over one billion US dollars of investment, and contributed to over 20 percent of China’s 
exports.18 In 1984, based on the early success of SEZs, the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) 
decided to open its economy further by extending similar relaxed economic policies to fourteen 
additional cities in coastal areas along the Pearl and Yangtze River Deltas. By 1992, the CCP 
further extended the concept of “economic openness” to a few cities in China’s border areas and 
all interior provinces.19 Similar to the “reform and open up” initiative in China, in July 1991, 
India adopted a new economic policy of Liberalization, Privatization, and Globalization (LPG) to 
promote economic growth and make the Indian economy more globally competitive. Following 
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 the LPG policy, India underwent significant economic changes, such as tariff reduction and 
market deregulation.20 Having observed the positive effects of SEZs in China, the Indian 
government introduced the Special Economic Zones policy in 2000, which encouraged all state 
governments to start their own SEZs. Five years later, India passed the SEZ Act of 2005, which 
aimed to “promote investment from foreign and domestic sources” and provided the base for the 
creation of numerous zones throughout India. However, India did not use SEZs to test economic 
reforms as it had already liberalized its economy in the 1990s.21 Compared to China, the 
objective of the Indian SEZ Act was more generic and referred to the generation of additional 
economic activity and employment, which did not distinguish SEZs from other industrial 
clusters.  
China and India both aimed to use Special Economic Zones to diversify and modernize 
their economies by attracting advanced technology, yet the overemphasis on technological 
sectors in India may have led to a lack of economic diversity in Indian zones. The use of joint 
ventures in China accelerated the infusion of new technology, allowing SEZs such as Shenzhen 
to develop a competitive edge in manufacturing. By 1995, Shenzhen accounted for 14 percent of 
world output of floppy disks, 8 percent of hard disk drives, and 10 percent in magnetic heads.22 
Through absorbing foreign technologies and competing successfully in export markets, the zones 
also acted as conduits through which technology and foreign expertise were transferred to the 
rest of China. Well known foreign technology companies such as IBM, Compaq, Dell, and ACR 
established plants in the Guangdong province, where three of China’s first four SEZs were 
located.23 Similarly, India utilized SEZs to develop infrastructure and technology through private 
investment from foreign companies to boost economic growth, exports, and employment. Like 
China, India strived to use SEZs as a means of technological development through horizontal 
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 spillovers from multinational corporations.24 These spillovers included transfers of corporate 
management and technological training for staff, greatly improving production efficiency. India 
placed a particularly strong emphasis on technological development, as the SEZ Act of 2005 
exempted information technology zones from minimum size requirements, which spurred their 
proliferation compared to zones with other industries.25 In 2017, 273 of India’s 423 approved 
zones were in the IT sector.26 However, India's heavy emphasis on IT zones may have led to a 
lack of broad-based manufacturing development within SEZs.  
Linking its SEZ initiative to economic liberalization, China used zones to invite foreign 
and private investment, spurring technological advancement. In contrast, India was unable to 
share the same results despite its strong emphasis on IT zones. These differing experiences 
suggest that SEZs may have a more transformative effective, as witnessed in China, if SEZs are 
used to facilitate broader economic form or liberalization. Ambitions to use SEZs for 
experimentation with structural reform measures have the potential to unleash unprecedented 
growth; without such intentions, SEZs are often not “special” and become indistinguishable from 
other industrial clusters. 
Creating Incentives to Limit Corruption  
Differing incentives for zone management officials have contributed significantly to 
diverging SEZ outcomes between India and China. Chinese zone leaders were motivated to 
foster growth to meet developmental targets and the economic success of these zones resulted in 
strong government and public support. On the other hand, India’s SEZ framework failed to 
address the prevalence of corruption, with state governments being criticized for appearing “to 
be favoring the interests of SEZ developers, which included some of India’s largest private-
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 sector firms, over the needs of people whose lives would be deeply affected by the arrival of 
these new industrial spaces.”27   
While China’s SEZs were established on land belonging to the state, land acquisition in 
India was controlled by private-sector developers, which led to a stronger likelihood of conflicts 
and corruption. In China, the state holds ultimate ownership of land and has the right to allocate 
this land.28 As a result, it was much easier for China to acquire land needed by SEZs to develop 
industries. Indeed, all five of China’s SEZs were owned and developed by the government, while 
only nine of over 200 SEZs in India were developed by the state.29 While Indian citizens and 
corporations generally have the right to own private property, the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) 
of 1894 “allows state governments to identify land for acquisition and issue necessary 
notifications accordingly.”30 Under both the LAA and the Special Economic Zone Act of 2005, 
government and corporate entities could transfer the land acquired for public purpose to private 
companies for development. As a result, small landowners could lose their land with little 
compensation, benefiting large private industries. For instance, in 2004 the Andhra Pradesh 
Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (APIIC) established the Polepally SEZ in the Telangana 
State. Under the LAA, APIIC seized property from residents of the Polepally village and 
allocated this land to pharmaceutical firms. The Polepally community eventually lost 693 acres 
of land, and 339 families lost their personal property. While the government issued rehabilitation 
cards to Polepally residents for jobs in 2007, these promises were not fulfilled. Displacement 
eventually drove Polepally farmers into unemployment, as they were ill-equipped to get a job in 
the SEZ industry.31 This case illustrates how the land acquisition process went wrong through 
corrupt and discriminatory practices at the local level, resulting in harmful economic, social, 
environmental and health impacts. Furthermore, India’s SEZ Act of 2005 simplified the 
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 procedures for creating SEZs in order to spur more investment and development.32 Due to the 
relaxed requirements to create SEZs in India, large numbers of projects passed formal approval, 
but many of them never became operational. The Polepally SEZ is just one example of many 
failed SEZs in India: out of India’s 423 proposed SEZs, only 221 zones are legitimately 
operational.33 Additionally, private developers often used zones for non-manufacturing purposes, 
taking advantage of the relaxed SEZ policy to subsidize real estate developments such as housing 
and retail and leisure complexes. Before 2007, up to 65 percent of land in SEZs could be used for 
such non-manufacturing activities, and export-promotion was “little more than an afterthought.” 
In response to political backlashes following the Polepally SEZ, allowable non-processing usage 
of SEZ land was reduced from 65 percent to 50 percent in 2007, which still allowed significant 
usage of SEZ land for real estate development.34 Cases such as the Polepally zone tainted SEZ 
reputation as grabbing private property from farmers, fueling  significant public resistance 
against SEZs, resulting in their downsizing and cancellation by the federal government.  
Much of the investments in China during the early stages of SEZ development also went 
into real estate speculation, and zones were used in corrupt deals to smuggle illegal goods on to 
the mainland through the Xiamen SEZ.35 The Chinese authoritarian political system and unitary 
state allowed for direct intervention regarding these issues of corruption through policy 
changes.36 Despite the growing number of China’s SEZs since their original establishment, most 
of them have goals and targets in areas such as GDP growth, exports, employment, and FDI 
generation. These expectations placed much responsibility on zone management officials, 
motivating them to maximize efficiency and economic growth.  In contrast, the Indian 
government, which gave local zones more production autonomy, generally did not implement 
measurable performance targets for its zones.37 Farmers thus resisted the government's use of 
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 eminent domain to seize private property for SEZ development, especially knowing that their 
land would not even be used productively for public purposes. People who did not own land—
yet depended on it for their livelihoods in existing local economies—also fiercely resisted SEZ 
land acquisition. For instance, a combination of local opponents, activist groups, and politicians 
campaigned against the chemical industry SEZ proposed at Nandigram in the West Bengal state. 
Clashes with police led to violence in March of 2007, claiming the lives of fourteen people. The 
uproar that followed led to the cancellation of the project, a temporary moratorium on SEZs and 
a reduction in their maximum allowed size to 5000 hectares.38 Such “land wars” in India have 
led to the cancellation, delay, and downsizing of high-profile investments. With a history of 
corruption and protests, state governments are reluctant to support SEZs or finance the 
infrastructure, contrasting China’s continuous support of its zones.  
In summary, broader political systems and incentives for zone officials significantly 
impacted the performance of SEZs. For zones to benefit local development, incentives for state 
officials should align with economic development objectives, so that corruption is sufficiently 
constrained. Furthermore, zones need strong and long-term government commitment to ensure 
policy continuity and economic efficiency.  
Offering Local Autonomy within SEZs 
 Another important difference is that China has given more autonomy to its SEZs than 
India, despite India’s democratic government and a liberalized economy. Both the size and 
institutional freedom granted to SEZs in China allowed local governments to tailor their 
approaches towards regional needs; conversely, land and policy restrictions in India have 
reduced the potential economic success of SEZs.  
While China and India both implemented SEZs in strategic geographical locations along 
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 the coast, India’s SEZs were designated to much smaller areas of land and faced strict industry 
regulations, reducing the scope of foreign investment. China established SEZs in coastal regions 
with both open access to foreign markets and large amounts of land, facilitating export growth.39 
Xi Zhongxun, the First Party Secretary of Guangdong Province, stated in 1979 that CCP chose to 
establish zones in Guangdong and Fujian provinces because “their resources are relatively 
abundant. They possess favorable conditions for economic development.”40 Shenzhen's location 
was particularly strategic because it was situated across a river from Hong Kong, a UK-
controlled colony at that time from which China was striving to learn capitalist methods of 
economic growth.41 China’s placement of SEZs (such as Shenzhen) effectively capitalized on its 
geographical proximity to strong economies such as Hong Kong and Macau, accelerating foreign 
trade and investment. These zones were also located in coastal areas far from the center of 
political power in Beijing, thus reducing the influence of central bureaucracies which continued 
to govern under the model of a closed, planned economy and allowing for easier experimentation 
of the free-market economic policies. While India had also identified geographically 
advantageous locations for its SEZs, the government designated these zones to much smaller 
portions of land. The Indian Parliament's SEZ Rules of 2006 states that “a multi-product SEZ 
shall have a contiguous area of 1000 hectares or more.” For sector specific SEZs in industries 
such as electronics, the jewelry sector, and information technology, the minimum size 
requirement is just ten hectares. Furthermore, in April 2007, the Indian Government capped the 
maximum area of an SEZ at 5,000 hectares in response to growing public and federal resistance; 
consequently, 70.4 percent of India’s SEZs are less than 100 hectares.42 By comparison, the 
average size of SEZs in China is approximately 8,500 hectares, and Shenzhen has a total area of 
160,000 square kilometers.43 In the absence of scale, it is difficult to recoup the costs of building 
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 expensive infrastructure. Additionally, without a large number of firms, the synergies arising 
from joint ventures are lost.44 For instance, the Rajiv Gandhi Technology SEZ is about 100 
hectares, and had only attracted three foreign firms as of 2015 since its original establishment in 
2007.45 Although land restrictions in India were intended to prevent corruption and reduce risk of 
failure, in reality, they diluted the business profitability of SEZs and restricted potential for 
economic growth.  
While China allowed more institutional autonomy for SEZs, enabling local governments 
to create programs tailored to regional needs, SEZ policies in India faced strict government 
regulations. For example, guidelines for the Shenzhen zone prior to 1981 stipulated that foreign 
direct investors had to be high-technology firms, yet this description later changed to “some 
technology” during the 1990s.46 The relaxation of specific industry guidelines allowed Shenzhen 
to specialize in industries such as manufacturing, which better matched the area’s capacity, 
particularly the abundance of cheap labor. Economic freedom also enabled Shenzhen to provide 
more opportunities for employment and social protection, thus attracting migrant workers: a 
supply of both low-cost and skilled labor. By 1989, more than one million migrant workers, who 
mostly came from underdeveloped rural provinces, had moved to Shenzhen.47 In contrast, 
prospective SEZ developers in India must specify what facilities will be developed, how much 
investment they will attract, and how many jobs they will create, thus restricting the autonomy of 
local governments. In addition, all but twelve of India’s SEZs were industry-specific, meaning 
that the government only allowed for a particular form of production. For instance, 60 percent of 
SEZs were pre-designated as technology zones. These tight government regulations limited the 
range of industries present in the SEZs and prevented them from forging strong linkages with the 
rest of the economy. Overemphasis on IT sectors also limited the impact of SEZs in more labor-
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 intensive industries such as handicraft production, where India had significant comparative 
advantages. Although these industries do not use advanced technology, they have a large export 
market and high potential to generate employment, especially for the low-income population.48 
Using SEZs to promote such industries would have made SEZs more impactful for India’s 
economic development and poverty alleviation. 
 Case studies of zones such as Shenzhen in China illustrate the benefits of limited zone 
planning by the national government, and greater autonomy to local governments.49 Unlike SEZs 
in China, India’s zones cannot tailor their industries towards regional needs because the 
government pre-designates their industries, illustrating that local autonomy and flexibility are 
critical for SEZs to maximize their true potential.  
Map: Location of SEZs in China and India50 
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 Conclusion 
 
The difference in SEZ performance between India and China highlights that countries 
cannot simply replicate the Chinese SEZ model to promote economic growth; rather, states must 
design their own unique policies that promote economic reform, reduce government corruption, 
and empower local decision making. For SEZs to have the same transformative effect as 
witnessed in China, where these “economic laboratories” played a pivotal role in revolutionizing 
China’s economy, SEZs should be used to facilitate broader economic reform or liberalization.  
Without such intentions, SEZs are often not “special” and become indistinguishable from other 
industrial clusters. Furthermore, countries attempting to implement SEZs must create a thorough 
legal and institutional framework that limits corruption, particularly in land acquisition, which 
leads to inefficiency and can seriously undermine SEZ development. The central government 
also must both continuously support developmental zones and grant relative autonomy to local 
governments so that SEZs can utilize their comparative advantages.  
Perhaps inspired by the transformative success of China’s zones, the number of SEZs has 
increased dramatically worldwide in recent decades. In 1964, 80 SEZs in 30 countries generated 
about 6 billion USD in exports and employed about one million people. Today, 3,000 SEZs 
operate in 120 countries and account for over US $600 billion in exports and 50 million jobs.51 
Many developing countries experimenting with SEZs reflect a similar economic philosophy as 
China and India and can learn from their SEZ policies. For instance, like China, Cuba operates 
under a unitary system and is slowly liberalizing their economy to address lagging economy 
growth. Indeed, in 2013, Cuba implemented its first SEZ in Mariel, enabling foreign companies 
to invest in the country without intervention from the Cuban state.52 Poland, which currently has 
14 SEZs, also parallels India’s economic history as the two countries operate under democratic 
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 governments and underwent economic liberalization in the 1990’s.53 It is imperative for 
countries seeking to implement SEZs to understand the underlying causes of success or failure 
and adopt policies to maximize their benefits for economic growth.
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